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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Trinity
Lutheran, and Trumpism: Codifying Fiction with
Administrative Gaslighting
Robin Knauer Maril1
INTRODUCTION
For over a century, courts have weighed state actions that balance the restraints of
the Establishment Clause with the obligations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Establishment Clause prohibits the making of a
law respecting the establishment of any religion, while the Free Exercise Clause provides
that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”2 The space
between these two strongholds of our democracy has been described by the United States
Supreme Court as the “play within the joints.”3 As the Supreme Court explained in Locke
v. Davey,4 there are state actions that are “permitted by the Establishment Clause, but not
required by the Free Exercise Clause.”5 A number of recent high profile cases before the
Court have sought to further define the contours of this space, and determine the limitations
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). These cases, however, have provided
little clarity for the government with respect to its implementation of federal policies and
programs.6 Despite the absence of clear guidance from the Court, the Trump administration
has consistently pointed to Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer and
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. as mandates to protect and enable religious-based
discrimination by federal grantees and contractors delivering federal services.7 In doing so,
1

Visiting Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law. I would like to thank Sherwet
Witherington for her thoughtful edits and contributions.
2
U.S. CONST. amend I.
3
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
4
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
5
Id. at 719.
6
See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
7
See, e.g., Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause's Religious
Exemption, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,677 (proposed on Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60) (adopting
a regulation designed to strip workers of basic protections and empowering businesses and organizations
receiving taxpayer dollars to discriminate against their employees with few safeguards from abuse); Health
and Human Services Grants Regulation, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,831 (proposed on Nov. 19, 2019) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 75) (proposing revisions to the federal Uniform Administrative Requirements for grant
programs that strip explicit nondiscrimination provisions from the existing text); Equal Participation of
Faith-Based Organizations in the Department of Labor's Programs and Activities: Implementation of
Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2,937 (proposed Jan. 17, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2)
(allowing providers operating a voucher program to require a beneficiary to engage in religious activities);
Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. 27,846 (proposed
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the administration has dismissed the consensus of legal scholars and commentators
regarding the limitations of these opinions.
Throughout Trump’s first term in office, his administration has misapplied and
misrepresented recent Supreme Court decisions and statutes to sanction the adoption of
expansive religious exemptions for organizations receiving federal funding. Proponents of
this routinized repeal of civil rights protections argue that the Trump administration is
merely restoring the correct balance of religious liberties in the federal government.8
However, the regulations and policies included in this campaign unconstitutionally
broaden the already robust religious protections provided by statutes and the Court and
have the effect of dismantling the civil rights infrastructure of the past fifty years. These
actions reach beyond the expansive Bush-era faith-based regulations by removing
beneficiary protection and prioritizing organizational and church access to taxpayer-funded
grants.9
This Article addresses the Trump administration’s consistent misinterpretation and
misapplication of legal precedent to support unnecessary religious exemptions that exceed
constitutional mandates and impair the rights of third parties to access federal services and
programs. This Article specifically focuses on the Trump administration’s application of
RFRA,10 Trinity Lutheran,11 and Hobby Lobby12 as egregious examples of the
administration’s efforts to gaslight the American public in order to elevate the rights of
large religious organizations. Part I provides an overview of Trinity Lutheran13 and the
traditional understanding of the appropriate intersection of federal funding and free
exercise. Part I also demonstrates how disparate Trump agencies use Trinity Lutheran as a
mandate to dismantle civil rights protections and promote religious-based discrimination
with federal funding. Part II discusses RFRA in the context of enforcement of general
nondiscrimination and civil rights laws, Hobby Lobby,14 and the rights that RFRA affords
organizations doing business with the federal government. Part II also discusses the Trump
administration’s abuse of RFRA to sanction sweeping, unsupported government reforms
June 14, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 438, 440, 460 and 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147, 155, 156)
(eliminating the explicit inclusion of discrimination on the basis of “gender identity” within the regulation’s
sex nondiscrimination protections); Department of Housing and Urban Development, Revised
Requirements Under Community Planning and Development Housing Programs (Spring 2019),
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201904&RIN=2506-AC53 (allowing
shelters receiving taxpayer dollars to turn transgender people away entirely or provide unsafe housing);
Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Attorney General Sessions Issues Guidance
on Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, (Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with Department of Justice),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-issues-guidance-federal-law-protectionsreligious-liberty (implementing a sweeping directive to federal agencies regarding religious exemptions in
part utilizing an overly broad interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
8
Pete Madden, Jeff Sessions Consulted Christian Right Legal Group on Religious Freedom Memo, ABC
NEWS, (October 6, 2017, 6:24 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/jeff-sessions-consulted-christian-legalgroup-religious-freedom/story?id=50336322.
9
See generally, The Quiet Revolution: The President’s Faith Based and Community Initiative: A Seven
Year Progress Report, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2008), https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/government/fbci/The-Quiet-Revolution.pdf.
10
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb4 (1993).
11
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
12
573 U.S. 682 (2014).
13
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
14
573 U.S. 682 (2014).
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and regulations. Finally, in Part III, this Article concludes that given the faulty legal support
of these cases, the regulations implemented under them fail to meet the requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act and are therefore legally specious. Courts should thus
vacate these legally specious regulations when the regulations are challenged.
I.

TRINITY LUTHERAN V. COMER: EQUAL ACCESS TO TIRE SCRAPS, NOT A CARTE
BLANCHE TO DISCRIMINATE.
A. Playground Resurfacing and Free Exercise: States on Notice

In 2012, a preschool and childcare center operated by Trinity Lutheran Church in
Columbia, Missouri, applied to receive a state grant to update its playground surface.15 The
Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offered grants to schools that
reimbursed the cost of purchasing playground surfaces made from recycled tires.16 These
awards were made on a competitive basis.17 The state enforced a “strict and express policy
of denying grants to any applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious
entity,” citing the Establishment Clause of the state Constitution.18 As a result of this
policy, Trinity Lutheran was determined ineligible and denied the grant.19 The state
declined to provide the grant to the church, citing concerns of violating the Establishment
Clause of the state Constitution.20 Trinity Lutheran challenged the DNR’s denial, alleging
violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech
Clauses of the First Amendment.21 The District Court for the Western District of Missouri
granted DNR’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that excluding a
religious institute from the grant program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.22 The
court further found no evidence in Supreme Court precedent that suggested that the
decision not to award a grant evinced hostility toward religion in violation of the neutrality
toward religion mandated by the Establishment Clause.23 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision.24
In its 2017 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s judgment,
finding that Missouri had violated the church’s Free Exercise rights by refusing to provide
the grant solely because of the school’s religious status.25 The majority decision, drafted
by Chief Justice Roberts, was joined by Justices Kennedy, Alito, Kagan, Thomas, and
Gorsuch.26 Justices Gorsuch and Thomas authored concurring opinions.27 Justice

15

Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2017.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (D. Mo. 2013).
22
Id. at 1155, 1157.
23
Id. at 1155.
24
Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d at 790.
25
Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2025.
26
Id. at 2016.
27
Id.
16
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Sotomayor authored the dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg.28 The majority opinion relied
heavily on the distinction between religious status and conduct to determine that “denying
a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on
the free exercise of religion that can be justified only by a state interest ‘of the highest
order.’”29
The Trinity Lutheran Court relied heavily on McDaniel v. Paty30 to further define
state action burdening free exercise.31 McDaniel struck down a Tennessee law that
disqualified ministers from serving as delegates to the State’s constitutional convention.32
The McDaniel Court found that requiring the complainant to step down from his status as
a minister to be a delegate was a choice that unduly burdened his free exercise of religion.33
In applying McDaniel to the state’s decision in Trinity Lutheran, the Court held that like
the restrictive statute at question in McDaniel, “the Department’s policy puts Trinity
Lutheran to a choice: It may participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain
a religious institution.”34 In quoting McDaniel, the Court held that “[t]o condition the
availability of benefits . . . upon [a recipient’s] willingness to . . . surrender[] his religiously
impelled [status] effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional liberties.”35
Here, the Court added the word “status” in brackets, which did not appear in the original
text of the McDaniel decision.36 This addition makes clear that the majority opinion solely
focused on how state actions unduly burden free exercise based on an individual or entity’s
religious “status” as opposed to activities or conduct in which they engage.
The Court then distinguished the actions taken by Missouri in Trinity Lutheran from
those of Washington state in Locke.37 In Locke, a prospective seminary student challenged
the state’s restriction of scholarship funding toward his divinity degree.38 The Washington
state scholarship program provided high performing students with financial scholarships
that could be used at religious and non-religious schools.39 However, students were not
allowed to use the scholarship towards a devotional theology degree—one “devotional in
nature or designed to induce religious faith.”40 In this case, the Supreme Court found that
this limitation did not unduly burden the student’s free exercise of religion.41 The Trinity
Lutheran Court distinguished the two cases by stating,
Washington’s restriction on the use of its scholarship funds was different.
According to the [Locke] Court, the State had ‘merely chosen not to fund a
distinct category of instruction.’ Davey was not denied a scholarship
because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he
28

Id.
Id. at 2019.
30
435 U.S. 618 (1978).
31
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.
32
McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621.
33
Id. at 629.
34
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2021.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 2022.
37
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
38
Id. at 718.
39
Id. at 716.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 725.
29
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proposed to do -- use the funds to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no
question that Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it
is -- a church.42
The Court further concluded that the religious conduct that the claimant in Locke sought to
pursue with state funds must be distinguished from this case.43 The Court stated that
“Washington’s restriction on the use of its funds was in keeping with the State’s
antiestablishment interest in not using taxpayer funds to pay for the training of clergy, an
‘essentially religious endeavor,’” and held that “nothing of the sort can be said about a
program to use recycled tires to resurface a playground.”44 This conclusion indicates that
in cases involving programs that do involve “essentially religious endeavors”—including
religious programming and ministry in the context of federal program service delivery—
the Locke standard should apply.
B. The Federal Government’s Administrative Misapplication of Trinity Lutheran
In the three years following the Trinity Lutheran decision, the Trump administration
has routinely cited the Court’s reprimand of the State of Missouri as cover for governmentwide revisions to civil rights regulations and policies.45 For example, the Department of
Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) issued a directive in
August 2018 and a proposed regulation in June 2019, revising the Office’s rules binding
federal contractors, in which it cited directly to the case.46 OFCCP conducts audits,
investigates complaints of employment discrimination, and reviews hiring data to ensure
compliance with Executive Order 11246.47 Since 1965, Executive Order 11246 has
provided meaningful protections for employees of federal contractors and subcontractors
from discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin.48 Over the past five
decades, protections have been added to include discrimination because of sex, sexual
orientation, and gender identity.49 These protections provide security to workers and equip
them with meaningful administrative recourse.50 Importantly, it also provides contractors
with a clear set of expectations and standards regarding their treatment of employees.51

42

Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.
Id. at 2024.
44
Id. at 2023.
45
Id. at 2024 (including the narrowing language as Footnote 3 to the Court’s finding that the Missouri rule
amounts to “churches need not apply”).
46
Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious Exemption, 84
Fed. Reg. 41,677 and, 41,680-81 (proposed on Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“This
approach, which recognizes contractors’ exercise of religion, is also consistent with Supreme Court
decisions emphasizing that “condition[ing] the availability of benefits upon a recipient’s willingness to
surrender his religiously impelled status effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional
liberties.” (citing Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2022 (alterations omitted) (quoting McDaniel,
435 U.S. at 626 (plurality opinion)).
47
Locke, 540 U.S. at 716.
48
Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965).
49
Exec. Order No. 13672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 21, 2014).
50
Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 at § 209 (Sept. 24, 1965).
51
Id. at § 202 (Sept. 24, 1965).
43

5

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2020

The proposed 2019 regulation (2019 Proposed Regulation) incorporated expansive
religious exemptions from compliance with these nondiscrimination provisions.52 As
proposed, this regulation would empower a for-profit federal contractor to present religious
belief as a defense to a claim or finding of employment discrimination.53 This exemption
would be available to any contractor that holds itself out to the public as carrying out a
religious mission.54 The 2019 Proposed Regulation states that this can include providing
OFCCP with an unpublished, publicly unavailable response to a private inquiry regarding
their religious status.55 It does not require that the public—including the contractor’s own
workers—receive actual notification of exemption from nondiscrimination requirements.56
The proposal also specifically allows taxpayer-funded businesses to consider tenets of their
faith when making employment and benefit decisions.57 Accordingly, organizations can
pick and choose which tenets and standards are applied to particular individuals or groups.
Businesses can also enforce tenets of their faith differently—even among impacted
populations. For example, a religiously affiliated hospital could hire an openly LGBTQ
doctor but refuse to provide spousal or transition-related health benefits based on religion.58
In the preamble to the 2019 Proposed Regulation, the Department of Labor cites the
Supreme Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran as one of a series of cases in which the Court
has “addressed the freedoms and anti-discrimination protections that must be afforded
religion-exercising organizations and individuals under the United States Constitution and
federal law.”59 The preamble further excuses this broad exemption by arguing that the
exemption,
. . . recognizes contractors’ exercise of religion, [and] is also consistent with
Supreme Court decisions emphasizing that ‘condition[ing] the availability
52

See, Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious Exemption,
84 Fed. Reg. 41,677, 41,679, 41,682-85 (proposed on Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60)
(defining “religion” as a term that is not limited to religious belief but also includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice; defining “particular religion” to clarify that the religious exemption allows
religious contractors not only to prefer in employment individuals who share their religion, but also to
condition employment on acceptance of or adherence to religious tenets as understood by the employing
contractor; defining “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society” as one that: (1)
is “organized for a religious purpose,” meaning that it was conceived with a self-identified religious
purpose, (2) holds itself “out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose”, and (3) exercises “religion
consistent with, and in furtherance of, a religious purpose”; defining “exercise of religion” as any sincere
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief”; defining
“sincere” by “merely ask[ing] whether a sincerely held religious belief actually motivated the institution’s
actions”; and proposing to apply a but-for standard of causation when evaluating claims of discrimination
by religious organizations based on protected characteristics other than religion).
53
See id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 41,679 (“[This proposal] is also intended to make clear that religious employers can condition
employment on acceptance of or adherence to religious tenets without sanction by the federal government,
provided that they do not discriminate based on other protected bases.”).
59
Id. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2017) (noting that
the government violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when it conditions a generally
available public benefit on an entity’s giving up its religious character, unless that condition withstands the
strictest scrutiny).”
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of benefits upon a recipient’s willingness to surrender his religiously
impelled status effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional
liberties.’ Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022 (alterations omitted) (quoting
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion)). These
decisions naturally extend to include the right to compete on a level playing
field for federal government contracts. See id. (government burdens
religious exercise when it so conditions ‘‘a benefit or privilege,’’
‘‘eligibility for office,’’ ‘‘a gratuitous benefit,’’ or the ability ‘‘to compete
with secular organizations for a grant’’ (quoted sources omitted)). Accord
sec. 1, E.O. 13831 (the executive branch’s policy is to allow ‘‘faith-based
and community organizations, to the fullest opportunity permitted by law,
to compete on a level playing field for . . . contracts . . . and other Federal
funding opportunities’’).60
This is a gross misapplication of the Trinity Court’s intentionally narrow decision. The
preamble obscures the narrow holding of the case and misleadingly suggests that it requires
the federal government to grant broad religious exemptions to federal contractors. 61 The
2019 Proposed Regulation ignores the Court’s limiting language, which protects
organizations from discrimination solely on the basis of religious status, rather than
conduct. The Court includes in a now widely-cited footnote, “This case involves express
discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do
not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”62 The Department
fails to include this footnote, which legal scholars have broadly accepted as having a
limiting effect on the overall decision.63
The majority opinion could not have been clearer. The enforcement of a
nondiscrimination provision does not meet the threshold standard for burdening Free
Exercise as described by the Trinity Lutheran Court.64 As a rule, the Establishment Clause
does not prohibit the government from engaging in secular business with a religious
organization; however, the Free Exercise Clause does not mandate the government fund
religious activity or ignore religious-based actions that interfere with the operation of a
state-funded activity.65 As a basic contractual requirement, businesses are prohibited from
discriminating on the basis of religion, sex, or other protected characteristics included in
60

Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause's Religious Exemption, 84
Fed. Reg. at 41,680.
61
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2024-25 (finding that “[t]he exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a
public benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution
all the same, and cannot stand,” but using narrowing language to conclude that “[t]he State has pursued its
preferred policy to the point of expressly denying a qualified religious entity a public benefit solely because
of its religious character. Under our precedents, that goes too far.”).
62
Id. at 2024 (including the narrowing language as Footnote 3 to the Court’s finding that the Missouri rule
amounts to “churches need not apply”).
63
Special Feature: Symposium on the Court’s Ruling in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v.
Comer, SCOTUS BLOG (June 28, 2017), https://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/symposiaon-rulings-from-october-term-2016/symposium-on-the-courts-ruling-in-trinity-lutheran-church-ofcolumbia-inc-v-comer/.
64
Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2024-25.
65
Id. at 2023 (“[A] State's antiestablishment [sic] interest in not using taxpayer funds to pay for the training
of clergy [is one] of few areas in which a State's antiestablishment [sic] interests come more into play.”).
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Executive Order 11246. When a business is denied a federal contract because of
discriminatory actions, they are not penalized because of their religious status, but because
they fail to meet that basic contractual requirement. In sum, the federal government under
Executive Order 11246 and its original regulations did not turn away contractors because
of “who [they were]” but rather what they “do.”66 The Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran
does not demand that the Department exempt contractors from compliance with Executive
Order 11246.
Similarly, the Trump administration proposed sweeping changes to the federal
government’s charitable choice regulations in early 2020.67 The existing regulations were
adopted in 2015 to revise nine Bush-era regulations designed to increase the involvement
of faith-based organizations in operating federally funded social service programs. 68 The
existing charitable choice regulations (Existing Regulations) expanded on the basic
beneficiary protections in the original charitable choice regulations and required faithbased organizations to provide beneficiaries with explicit notice regarding their rights to
Id. (distinguishing Locke in concluding that “Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was;
he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the
ministry”).
67
Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in HUD Programs and Activities: Implementation of
Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 8215; Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in USAID's
Programs and Activities: Implementation of Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2916; Equal
Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in Veterans Affairs Programs: Implementation of Executive
Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2938; Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in Department of
Justice's Programs and Activities: Implementation of Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2921; Equal
Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in the Department of Labor's Programs and Activities:
Implementation of Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2929; Equal Opportunity for Religious
Organizations in U.S. Department of Agriculture Programs: Implementation of Executive Order 13831, 85
Fed. Reg. 2897; Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for
Federal Awards, Direct Grant Programs, State-Administered Formula Grant Programs, Developing
Hispanic-Serving Institutions Program, and Strengthening Institutions Program 85 Fed. Reg. 3190; Equal
Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in DHS's Programs and Activities: Implementation of Executive
Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2889.
68
The Quiet Revolution, supra note 9, at 33-34 (This highlighted that Bush-era faith-based initiative
conducted an audit of federal regulations and policies and determined that “[w]hile some limitations on
religious organizations within a Federal program are constitutionally required and appropriate, the audit
found that many Federal policies and practices went well beyond constitutional and legislative
requirements, arising from an overriding misperception by Federal ofﬁcials “that close collaboration with
religious organizations was legally suspect . . . For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s regulations for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program (which
provides Federal funds to localities to support nongovernmental services), and for the HOME program
(which gives funds to States and localities who often enlist community groups in efforts to provide
affordable housing) prohibited funding “as a general rule” from going to “primarily religious”
organizations for “any activities, including secular activities.” Under the HOME program, a “primarily
religious” organization could establish a “wholly secular entity” that could then take part in the program. In
the CDBG program, a further regulation provided that a “primarily religious” organization could take part,
if it agreed to a long list of restrictions, which included forfeiting its Title VII rights (a restriction not
required by the authorizing statute). Similarly, the Department of Education’s guidance for the Even Start
Family Literacy Program prohibited “pervasively sectarian” organizations from receiving direct funds
under the program and permitted such organizations to participate only as a subordinate to a “nonsectarian”
partner organization. Even where a program’s regulations or guidance documents did not speciﬁcally
invoke the pervasively sectarian distinction, the audit found some Federal, State, and local program staff
applied a similar, unwritten standard resulting in the exclusion of some faith-based organizations.”).
66
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be free from discrimination because of religion.69 Freedom from discrimination includes
the rights of beneficiaries to access services regardless of their religious belief, or refusal
to hold a religious belief or to attend or participate in religious activities.70 The Existing
Regulations also require faith based organizations to inform beneficiaries about the process
for filing a complaint.71 Importantly, the Existing Regulations require organizations to
make reasonable efforts to connect a prospective beneficiary with a secular or alternative
faith-based provider, if that beneficiary objected to the religious character of the
organization.72
The Existing Regulations also specifically define “direct” and “indirect” funding and
create different levels of discrimination protections for each. Direct funding includes grant
awards that are issued to an organization to provide a service on behalf of the government.73
Organizations receiving direct funding are prohibited from discriminating because of:
religion, religious belief, refusal to hold a religious belief, or a refusal to attend or
participate in a religious practice.74 However, religious organizations receiving indirect
funding are not required to modify their programs or activities to accommodate a
beneficiary who may object to the religious character of their program. 75 Indirect services
are paid through a voucher, certificate, or another similar form of government-funded
payment, this can include vouchers for child care or education, mental health services, or
other similar programs76 Under the Existing Regulations, this carve-out for indirectly
funded organizations was balanced by the requirement that, to be considered “indirect,”
the individual beneficiary must have access to a secular option.77
The Trump administration published proposals in 2020 that would remove the notice
and referral requirements incorporated in the Existing Regulations.78 The 2020 preambles
argue that requiring a religious organization to provide notice of rights when a secular
organization is not required to do so is religious discrimination.79 The 2020 proposed
69

Federal Agency Final Regulations Implementing Executive Order 13559: Fundamental Principles and
Policymaking Criteria for Partnerships with Faith-Based and Other Neighborhood Organizations, 81 Fed.
Reg. 19,355, 19,362 (Apr. 4, 2016).
70
See, e.g., id.
71
See, e.g., id.
72
Id.
73
What is the Difference Between Indirect Funding and Direct Funding?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/answers/grants-and-contracts/what-is-thedifference-between-indirect-direct-funding/index.html (“Indirect funding is funding that an organization
receives as the result of the genuine and independent private choice of a beneficiary through a voucher,
certificate, coupon, or other similar mechanism. Direct funding is funding that is provided to an
organization directly by a governmental entity or intermediate organization that has the same duties as a
government entity.”).
74
See supra note 68, and accompanying text.
75
Id.
76
Fundamental Principles and Policymaking Criteria for Partnerships with Faith-Based and Other
Neighborhood Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. at 19,426.
77
Id.
78
Numerous agencies, including the Justice Department, Health and Human Services, Labor, and Housing
and Urban Development, issued regulations to promote religious exemptions in accordance with the White
House Faith and Opportunity Initiative, Executive Order 13831. Executive Order 13831, 85 FR 2921
(DOJ), 85 FR 2974 (HHS), 85 FR 2929 (Labor), 85 FR 8215 (HUD), 85 FR 2938 (Veterans Affairs), 85
FR 2889 (DHS), 85 FR 2897 (USDA), 85 FR 3190 (Education), 85 FR 2916 (USAID).
79
Id.
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charitable choice regulations (2020 Proposed Regulations) would remove the existence of
a secular option requirement for funding to be considered “indirect.” However, the 2020
Proposed Regulations retain the lower nondiscrimination standard that relieves these
organizations from the obligation to modify or accommodate a beneficiary that objects to
the religious character of their organization.80 The 2020 Proposed Regulations would also
add language stating the program “may require attendance at all activities that are
fundamental to the program,” including religious activities.81 In practice, this will mean
that a beneficiary may be presented with only religiously-based service options in order to
use their voucher and may then be compelled to engage in religious practices or activities
by the organization.
The 2020 Proposed Regulations also assert that the existing requirement of a referral
to a secular organization is an undue burden.82 In support of removing the referral
requirement, the regulation cites directly to Trinity Lutheran.83 The use of Trinity Lutheran
to sanction religiously-based discriminatory actions is a similarly unfaithful application of
the standard set by the Court. Under the 2020 Proposed Regulations, federal agencies must
not only evaluate grant requests from faith-based organizations alongside secular
organizations (regardless of the organization’s religious status), but also hold these
organizations to a different and lesser standard regarding service delivery. The latter
mandate directly conflicts with the language of the Trinity Lutheran majority opinion.
II.

UNDERSTANDING NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS AND REQUEST FOR RELIGIOUSBASED EXEMPTIONS
A. RFRA and Hobby Lobby v. Burwell

In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in the
wake of the Supreme Court decision Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.84 In this case, Justice Scalia held that the Free Exercise
Clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug laws to ceremonial ingestion of
peyote.85 Therefore, the State could deny claimants’ unemployment compensation for
work-related misconduct based on use of the drug without violating the Constitution.86
The Smith decision ignited a swift response from diverse civil rights, religious, and
service groups including the ACLU, the Baptist Joint Committee, the Anti-Defamation
League, and the Human Rights Campaign. RFRA was designed to safeguard the rights of
vulnerable religious minorities like those targeted in Smith. RFRA prohibits the federal
government from “substantially burden[ing]” a person’s free exercise of religion unless it
is the least restrictive means by which to achieve a compelling government interest.87 The
RFRA balancing test was intended to create a uniform standard for analyzing free exercise
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claims. Over the past two decades, however, organizations and businesses seeking
exemptions from laws of general applicability weaponized RFRA.88
Although courts have not interpreted RFRA to exempt individuals from compliance
with these laws, Hobby Lobby89 provided an unprecedented re-interpretation of the statute
in 2014. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held that the Department of Health and
Human Service’s enforcement of the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate
violated RFRA.90 The Hobby Lobby Court held that requiring employers to cover access
to contraception on a group health insurance plan not only burdened the sincerely held
religious beliefs of the business, but was also not the least restrictive means to ensure
contraceptive coverage for workers.91 The Court also determined that the term “person”
under RFRA includes for-profit businesses.92
Although the impact of this decision on access to contraception and reproductive care
is inarguably profound, the RFRA analysis as written and employed by the Court is not
directly transferable to analyzing the constitutionality of nondiscrimination provisions. The
Court’s reliance on the “least restrictive means” prong isolates the decision’s usefulness in
other contexts. In Hobby Lobby, the Court determined that alternative, less restrictive
governmental actions were available to further the compelling interest of providing
healthcare.93 Nondiscrimination provisions are the least restrictive means to ending
discrimination, which is a well-established compelling interest.94 The government cannot
end discrimination if it allows discrimination to occur, or if some parties are exempt from
complying with generally applicable laws. Justice Alito limited the reach of this decision
to the specific facts at hand, dismissing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which raised the
concern that the decision could be used to excuse discrimination in hiring that is “cloaked
as religious practice to escape legal sanction.”95 Justice Alito concluded that “[the Court’s]
decision . . . provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in
providing equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and
prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”96
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See, e.g., EEOC v. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 591 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding that the
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Lower courts have directly ruled on the application of RFRA as a means to gain
exemption from civil rights provisions. The Sixth Circuit held in EEOC v. Harris Funeral
Homes97 that RFRA could not be used as a defense to otherwise unlawful discrimination.98
In this case, after successfully working at a Michigan funeral home for nearly six years,
Aimee Stephens informed her employer that she would be undergoing a gender transition,
and would begin wearing the women’s uniform to work.99 She was fired within days.100
The funeral home argued that Title VII should not apply to their business, because requiring
the funeral home to continue to employ Stephens while she presented as a woman would
constitute an unjustified substantial burden on the owner’s sincerely held religious belief
under RFRA.101 The Sixth Circuit disagreed.102 It found that to counter a claim under
RFRA, the government need only prove that the action in question is the least restrictive
means for accomplishing a compelling government interest.103 The Sixth Circuit cited two
lower federal courts holding that Title VII serves as the least restrictive means for ending
employment discrimination—a well-established compelling government interest.104 The
Court further relied on the decisions of state courts that held that nondiscrimination
provisions not only survive strict scrutiny, but also allow for fewer religious based
exemptions than other generally applicable laws.105
The Sixth Circuit also held that requiring an employer to recognize a worker’s gender
identity did not substantially burden the employer’s rights under RFRA.106 Specifically,
the Court held that, “as a matter of law, tolerating Stephens’s understanding of her sex and
gender identity is not tantamount to supporting it. . . . simply permitting Stephens to wear
attire that reflects a conception of gender that is at odds with Rost’s religious beliefs is not
a substantial burden under RFRA.”107 The Court distinguished “tolerating” Stephens’s
gender identity from “supporting” it and noted that eight other circuits have confirmed this
approach to applying RFRA.108
B. Systematic Manipulation of RFRA and Hobby Lobby
Immediately upon taking office, the Trump administration began implementing a
systematic rescission and redesign of civil rights and programmatic regulations based on a
distorted manipulation of RFRA and interpretation of case law. These government-wide
efforts were centralized through the Department of Justice. Under former Attorney General
Jeff Sessions, DOJ published a memorandum implementing sweeping directives across
97
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federal agencies regarding religious exemptions and the interpretation of RFRA to evaluate
existing regulations for potential intersections with religious rights. This guidance also
urged Departments to engage in rulemaking to amend any policies to explicitly allow
religious organizations and individuals to discriminate.109 As a result of this memo,
agencies as disparate as the Departments of Housing and Urban Development,110
Agriculture,111 and Labor112 engaged in misguided and unnecessary rulemaking, citing
RFRA and the Hobby Lobby opinion as mandates for reforms.
On November 19, 2019, Health and Human Services (HHS) published a proposed
rule revising the regulations adopting the federal Uniform Administrative Requirements
for grant programs.113 The Trump administration proposed a revision to this regulation that
stripped the explicit nondiscrimination provision, as well as a provision referencing the
decisions in U.S. v. Windsor114 and Obergefell v. Hodges115—the Supreme Court cases
recognizing federal marriage equality.116
Originally adopted in December 2016, the regulations implementing the Uniform
Administrative Requirements for grant programs prohibited discrimination in all HHS
grant programs.117 The preamble indicated that HHS designed the nondiscrimination
provision to align grant programs with the beneficiary protections in the HHS acquisition
regulations found at 45 C.F.R. 352.237–74.118 The 2016 regulation specifically prohibited
discrimination by HHS grantees on the basis of age, disability, sex, race, color, national
origin, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation.119
The 2016 HHS grant regulation provided essential security for individuals served
by HHS-funded programs that did not have an independent regulatory or statutory
nondiscrimination provision. In the absence of this protection, LGBTQ people, women,
and religious minorities will face an increased risk of discrimination or denial of taxpayerfunded services without recourse, including foster care and adoption programs, Head Start,
109
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senior supportive services, maternal health programs, and substance abuse recovery
programs.120
In the notice of proposed rulemaking, HHS expressed concerns that the existing
2016 regulation was unconstitutional and violated RFRA.121 However, in the recent case
of Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit rejected a claim for exemptions under
Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act, which is analogous to the relevant
provisions of this regulation.122 In Fulton, a religiously affiliated foster care agency
challenged the enforcement of a city-wide requirement that foster care agencies not
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.123 The agency argued that its religious
convictions prevented it from certifying same-sex married couples as foster parents.124 The
court found it “unlikely” that the nondiscrimination requirement imposed a “substantial
burden” on the agency under Pennsylvania law.125 “[E]ven if” there were a substantial
burden, however, the court held that the agency was “not likely to prevail on its RFRA
claim because the City’s actions are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
government interest.”126 As the court explained, “[i]t is black-letter law that ‘eradicating
discrimination’ is a compelling interest.”127 Therefore, “the mere existence of [plaintiff’s]
discriminatory policy is enough to offend the City’s compelling interest in antidiscrimination.”128
The 2016 HHS nondiscrimination rule targets the same forms of invidious
discrimination at issue in Fulton. As the Third Circuit determined in Fulton, the rule as
currently written advances a “compelling governmental interest” in prohibiting
discrimination.129 Further, the Third Circuit held that prohibiting such discrimination is the
least restrictive means sufficient to further this interest.130 The Trump administration’s
elimination of the enumerated protections within this regulation grants a blanket license to
entities receiving federal funds to discriminate without regard to the facts of any particular
case. Indeed, grantees could discriminate against LGBTQ individuals even if the
motivation for such discrimination were not religious at all.
III.

THESE REGULATIONS ARE NOT LEGALLY SUPPORTED AND VIOLATE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT.

The Trump administration’s persistent reliance on a novel and judicially contradicted
interpretation of RFRA to support expansive regulatory changes is a thinly veiled attempt
120
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to mislead the general public and to gaslight administrative lawyers, advocates, and
regulated entities. In each of the administrative actions taken under the guise of RFRA and
Trinity Lutheran, the federal government has failed to provide grantees, beneficiaries, and
the public with the legally required justification for these far-reaching changes. In all the
proposed regulations discussed above, the government provides mere sentences to explain
revisions that will impact millions of people. Although courts traditionally defer to the
agencies when interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Trump
administration’s reliance on an interpretation of RFRA that contradicts federal court
decisions interpreting the statute forfeits this nearly automatic deference.
This seemingly purposeful misinterpretation violates Section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that an agency action is unlawful if it is
found to be, “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.”131 In Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,132 the Supreme Court provided that
to meet this standard, “an agency must give adequate reasons for its decisions. The agency
‘must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”133 The
Court has also made clear that the “arbitrary and capricious” review includes a review of
the authority and legal reasoning employed by the agency.134
The Supreme Court has held that an agency action that conflicts with a previous
judicial interpretation of an unambiguous statute violates the APA regardless of the level
of deference to which the action is originally entitled.135 However, the Court has held that
an agency can dismiss judicial precedent and demand deference when the statute in
question is ambiguous or where Congress has provided room for agency discretion.136 An
agency is entitled to choose among different interpretations of the statute. However, here,
there is no alternative interpretation of RFRA by the courts.
The Sixth Circuit decision in EEOC v. Harris Funeral Home137 and the Third Circuit
decision in Fulton v. Philadelphia138 provide clear, consistent precedent that the executive
branch should follow—enforcement of generally applicable nondiscrimination provisions
does not violate RFRA and the statute does not mandate exemptions from compliance.139
Further, the statute as it pertains to exemptions and enforcement of such provisions is not
ambiguous. The unambiguous nature of the statute paired with this cross-circuit agreement
leaves no interpretative “gaps” for the administration to fill by regulation. The
administration’s application of RFRA as a mandate for reversing nondiscrimination
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provisions and granting broad exemptions to religious employers and organizations
conflicts with judicial precedent.
The administration’s application of Trinity Lutheran is similarly misleading.
Although the Court in Trinity Lutheran held in favor of Trinity Lutheran Church under the
Free Exercise Clause, it also acknowledged that its decision was far from a mandate.140
Further, it concretely established the distinction between discrimination on the basis of
mere status and government decisions based on an organization’s actions or conduct.141
The Trinity Lutheran decision clearly provides religious organizations and churches with
a “level playing field,” with access to federal grants and programs, initially codified by the
Bush-era faith-based regulations. The Justices, however, included explicit limiting
language that their decision does not engage with state decisions in response to religious
conduct. It is far from the mandate that the Trump administration has claimed.142
The Trump administration’s re-interpretation of RFRA, Hobby Lobby, and Trinity
Lutheran to mandate religious exemptions is unlawful and interferes with the “province
and duty” of Congress to design statutes and of the judiciary to interpret them.143 Therefore,
the Trump administration’s reliance on a misinterpretation of legal authority as “data” is
“arbitrary and capricious” and a clear violation of the APA.
CONCLUSION
Since taking office in January 2017, the Trump administration has engaged in an
aggressive, unconstitutional, and legally specious campaign to systematically rescind
administrative civil rights protections and import broad religious exemptions across the
federal register. Citing a troubling combination of recent and foundational cases, the
administration has coordinated a near-acrobatic legal analysis across federal rulemaking
that has ushered in an unprecedented disregard for the constitutional rights of beneficiaries
of federal programs. The administration’s manipulation of Supreme Court decisions as
mandates for these reforms is a direct violation of the APA, calling into question their
legitimacy and legal enforceability.
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